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COMMENTS
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-EFFECT OF
LAPSE OF TIME ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it always dif-
ficult to declare that something may not be published. But the great
general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by
other great societal interests. As a people we have come to recognize
that one of these societal interests is that of protecting an individual's
right to privacy. The right to know and the right to have others not
kiww are, simplistically considered, irreconcilable. But the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation
of the right to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved
with a minimum of intrusion upon the other.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1890 the right of one to recover for a truthful re-
porting of "private" facts or events of his life, both past and
present, was virtually non-existent. 2 Such a state of judicial
non-recognition of an individual's right to privacy might pos-
sibly have still existed today had not Warren and Brandeis
converted their personal reactions to a particular newspaper
article into a most influential thesis 3 on the rights of the in-
dividual to determine ". . . ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated to
others." 4
What has evolved in the last eighty years has been labeled
"a complex, subtle right, fundamentally concerned with an in-
tangible: the separate identity or the inviolate personality or
individuality of a person."5 Since 1903 there have been a num-
1. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 (1971).
2. PROSsER, LAW OF TORTS 829 (3d ed. 1964). There were, however, a
few cases which seemed to be "groping" in the direction of privacy and Judge
Cooley had spoken of "the right to be let alone."
3. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
4. Id. at 198, quoting from Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, 868, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (1971).
5. 5A BENDER'S PERSONAL INJuRY 764.1, 764.9 (1967).
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ber of cases" with a variety of holdings, and it is not surprising
that critics have branded the present state of privacy law as
"still that of a haystack in a hurricane."'7
There has been little attempt to affirm this right by stat-
ute, and those states8 that have recognized the right have done
so through individual cases.9 The tort of invasion of privacy
is measured by the objective standard of the sensibilities'0 of
the ordinary man balanced against the scope of newsworthi-
ness," the constitutional privilege' 2 of the press to give more
publicity to those who either voluntarily or involuntarily be-
come public figures and to publicize news and matters of gen-
eral public interest. What is objectionable depends not only
upon the mores of the particular community at any given time,
but also upon the damage party's status and the defendant's
motives.' 3
6. At least 400 cases so far have been brought on the basis of invasion of
privacy. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 829 (3d ed. 1964).
7. 5A BENDER'S PERSONAL INJURY 764.1, 764.9 (1967).
8. N.Y.CIvxL RIGHTS LAW §§50-51 (McKinney 1948); OxrA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, 839-40 (1958) ; UTAHI CODE ANN. 76-4-8, 76-4-9 (1953) ; VA. CODE ANN.
8-650 (1957). PROSSER at 804.
9. At least 36 state courts have recognized the right to privacy. Only four
states have expressly said that it is for the legislature to make any changes in
the old common law. These states are: Rhode Island, Nebraska, Texas, and
Wisconsin. See PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802, 804 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Thus the "thin-skinned" person is afforded no protection unless the
publication or actions referring to him would be highly offensive to the ordinary
man. The rule in many jurisdictions is that "it is only When the defendent
should know that the plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by the
conduct that a cause of action exists." Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 203, 218 (1970).
11. There is no precise legal definition of "newsworthiness." "That which
the court deems to be of general interest to the public" is one possible way of
considering the term. News can also be considered anything which is out of the
ordinary routine and on which the public has focused its attention. See PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 829, 844 (3d ed. 1964). For a discussion of newsworthiness and
the problems surrounding its definition, see also Note, "The Right of Privacy:
Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness," 30 U.
Cm. L. R. 722 (1963); Moore, A Study in the Practical Application of the
Right of Privacy, 22 S.C. L. Rv. 1 (1970).
12. The privilege referred to is the First Amendment guarantee of free
speech and press.
13. See 5A BENDER'S PERSONA. INJURY 764.1, 764.26 (1967).
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The so-called "balance" between right to privacy and con-
stitutional privilege appears to some 14 to have shifted more
favorably toward the privilege to such a degree that these
writers fear that the court in its recent pronouncements has
attempted to return the right to privacy to its pre-1890 status.
The much-heralded case of Time, Inc. v. Hill'5 went on record
as establishing that in reporting "newsworthy" subjects, mat-
ters of public interest, or about public figures, the constitu-
tional privilege extended not only to reporting truthful facts
but also to the disclosure of facts in a "false light."' 6 The
privilege would be withheld only if there was "knowing or
reckless falsity" on the publisher's part, the criterion origin-
ally established in the defamation case of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan.1 The Hill case must be considered in light of the
New York statute 8 which admittedly affords little protection
to newsworthy individuals and subjects and in light of the
scope of this case as falling within "false light" invasion of
privacy. This case does not appear to extend the scope of news-
worthiness to further aid the mass media,19 yet it must be
acknowledged that the constitutional privilege asserted does
present a very real barrier to those persons who assert that
14. See Pedrick, Publicity and Privacy: Is It Any of Our Business? 20 U.
TORONTO L.J. 391 (1970). The author states that "the right of privacy in the
U.S. is in a state of jeopardy, not because of judicial timidity, but, rather as a
result of hyper-activity on the part of our Supreme Court . . ." 20 U. TORONTO
LJ. at 397. Mr. Justice Black, however, takes the view that the rights of the
mass media are being hampered by restricted First Amendment privileges. Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (concurring opinion).
15. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
16. Representing the plaintiff in a "false light" is only one of the four types
of privacy. The other three types are physical intrusion upon the plaintiff, pub-
lic disclosure of embarrassing private facts, and appropriation of the plaintiff's
name or picture for defendant's commercial advantage.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this case the Court precluded recovery by a
public official for false and defamatory statements which were made concerning
his public conduct unless he could show actual malice or reckless disregard for
the truth.
18. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS §§50-51 (McKinney 1948). "This section is
limited to use of living person's name or picture without his consent for adver-
tising or business purposes, and does not include use of name or picture as part
of or in connection with text itself, or to illustrate text in newspaper or maga-
zine article or book." People, on Complaint of Stern v. Robert R. McBride &
Co., 159 Misc. 5, 288 N.Y.S. 501 (1936).
19. See Comment, Torts-Limitations on the Rights of Privacy-Privi-
lege to Report Matters of Public Interest, 21 S.C. L. REv. 92, 99 (1968).
1972]
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they or their actions are not newsworthy, or that they are not
public figures who have even less right to privacy than their
non-public brothers. The burden, therefore, seems to rest upon
the plaintiff to show that he does not come within the consti-
tutional ambit of the First Amendment privileges accorded
the mass media.
II. A POSSIBLE LIMITATION
If critics are justified in their belief that the right to pri-
vacy is threatened 2 and if the right is to survive, perhaps the
entire concept, or at least some aspect, of newsworthiness
must be more strictly construed or limited. Dean Prosser
touched on one possible limitation of the constitutional privi-
lege in his LAW OF TORTS :21 "One troublesome question, upon
which none of the cases dealing with the Constitutional privi-
lege has yet touched, is that of the effect of lapse of time, dur-
ing which the plaintiff has returned to obscurity."
The majority of the courts which have dealt with the ef-
fect of lapse of time upon the question of the existence of a
right of privacy have tended to hold that once a person and his
activities have come into the sphere of public interest, he is not
entitled subsequently to be regarded as having regained a pri-
vate status, at least as far as that particular activity is con-
cerned.- - In Barbieri v. News-Journal Co. 23 the Delaware
court held that an article referring to the plaintiff as "the last
person to feel the lash" did not invade his privacy when the
article had a legitimate purpose: the reporting of a proposed
bill designating mandatory whippings for certain offenses.
The court also pointed out that the article did not "violate the
ordinary decencies," nor did it represent commercial exploita-
tion of the plaintiff's life.
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.24 also falls into that cate-
gory of cases which hold that once a person has gained the
status of a "public figure" he retains that status even after a
lapse of years and an attempt to stay out of the public view.
20. See Note 14, supra.
21. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802, 827 (4th ed. 1971).
22. See Armot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 203 (1970).
23. 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963). See also Branson v. Fawcett Publica-
tions, 124 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Ill. 1954) ; Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704,
211 P.2d 320 (1949).
24. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
[Vol. 24
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THE NEW YORKER magazine published an article on one-time
child prodigy Sidis which compared the brilliant future that
had been predicted for him in his youth with Sidis' present
non-inspiring, anonymous life. Although the article was not
lurid or unfavorable to Sidis, he regarded it as an invasion of
his privacy. Unfortunately he failed to persuade the court,
which took the view that since Sidis' brilliance was so widely
acclaimed in his youth, it would be only natural for the public
to be greatly interested in the accomplishments (or lack of ac-
complishments) of his later life.
So far only a few cases have indicated that there may
come a time or point beyond "which a past event is no longer
news, and the unnecessary mention of the plaintiff's name in
connection with it may afford a cause of action." 25 The most
well-known case in this category is Melvin v. Reid,26 in which
defendants had produced a movie based on the plaintiff's mur-
der trial and scandalous life as a prostitute several years after
she had been acquitted and rehabilitated. The three major
factors justifying her right to recovery were the commercial
exploitation of her past life-style, lack of legitimate purpose
in publicizing the plaintiff's activities and the plaintiff's re-
habilitation. Had the defendents merely based their movie on
incidents from the plaintiff's life without using her name, then
quite possibly she would not have had a cause of action.27 The
court did not hold that a time lapse in itself was sufficient to
keep the movie from being newsworthy, but that the combina-
tion of time lapse, rehabilitation, and commercial exploitation
did affect the newsworthiness privilege. Had the story been
published in a respectable journal and with a legitimate pur-
pose, the result at that time may have been different.28
In a more recent case, Wagner v. Fawcett Publications,29
the lapse of two months between the murder of plaintiff's
daughter and the publication of an article about the murder
25. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 802, 827-828 (4th ed. 1971).
26. 112 Cal. App. 273, 297 P. 91 (1931). The court did not base its deci-
sion on the right of privacy, but rather on a section of the New York Constitu-
tion which "guaranteed to citizens the right of procuring and obtaining safety
and happiness." Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 203, 269 (1970).
27. Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 203, 269 (1970).
28. Note, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the
Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHi. L. R. 722 (1963).
29. 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962).
19721
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was held sufficient to limit the newsworthiness privilege, ac-
cording to the original opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. The court later reversed that decision and found for
the defendent, stating that the case was current, since legal
procedings were still taking place. This case is significant in
that it did recognize the detrimental effect of time lapse on
newsworthiness, even though the final result was unfavorable
to the plaintiff. Despite this federal court's acknowledgement
of the effect of passage of time on the right to publish items
of public interest, the rule has still remained in force that a
lapse of time will not operate to take away the privilege to re-
port on what was once a matter of public interest. The recent
case of Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association,30 however, may
represent a change of judicial thinking on the effect of lapse
of time on the newsworthiness privilege.
III. BRISCOE V. READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION
In 1956 Marvin Briscoe and another man hijacked a truck,
an action which resulted in a criminal record for Briscoe
which was, of course, a matter of public record. Briscoe there-
after formed a new and respectable life for himself among peo-
ple who knew nothing of his criminal record. Eleven years
later READE,'S DIGEST published an article on hijacking in
which Briscoe's name and the circumstances (but not the date)
of his crime were recounted. As a result of this adverse public-
ity, Briscoe was scorned by both his friends and his eleven-
year old daughter, who was also unware of her father's past.
He brought suit against the defendent Association for inva-
sion to his privacy, conceding that publication of the facts of
his crime and the particular subject of the article may have
fallen within the "newsworthy" category, but that his name
did not. A demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained
without leave to amend and the plaintiff brought an appeal to
the California Supreme Court.
Considering the present state of the law of privacy and
the fact that Briscoe's crime was a matter of public record,
one might reasonably assume that the court would once again
proclaim the superiority of the First Amendment rights and
inform Briscoe that by his own actions he became a figure
whose past actions and name were and still are newsworthy,
30. 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P2d 34 (1971).
[Vol. 24
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and that to preclude the media from alluding to matters and
persons of public record would result in a further stifling of
their constitutional rights. Surprisingly enough the court af-
firmed Briscoe's right to bring a cause of action. In its opinion
the court made pronouncements which could serve both to
clarify and to limit the privilege, and the fact that this case
presents a lapse of time question which is considered in light
of the constitutional privilege is significant in itself. Those
cases which had previously differed from the general rule as
to effect of lapse of time were decided before the First Amend-
ment rights of free speech and press were expressly made ap-
plicable to privacy tort law.
The court acknowledged that the "right to keep informa-
tion private was bound to clash with the right to disseminate
information to the public," 31 and that in order to decide the
case before it they would have "to consider the character of
these competing interests. ' 32 As to the rights to be accorded
to the press the court stated the following:
'Freedom of discussion * * * must embrace all issues about which in-
formation is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period. * * *' . . . .The scope of the
privilege thus extends to almost all reporting of recent events, even
though it involves the publication of a purely private individual's name
or likeness.33
Thus the court stressed the power of the privilege as it ex-
tends to recent matters and made it quite clear that any plain-
tiff suing under the privacy tort for publication concerning
current events or names will find it very hard to rebut the
presumption that the publication is privileged. The court then
considered the question of whether or not reporting the facts
and names of past crimes and offenders would "serve the same
public interest functions"3 4 as served by reporting of recent
crimes and concluded that reports of the facts of crimes com-
mitted in the past could indeed be considered newsworthy in
both a deterrent and educational sense. As to reports of the
names of past offenders, however, the court expressed doubt
as to the interests functions which would be served:
31. Id. at 869, 483 P.2d at 37.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 870, 483 P2d at 38.
34. Id. at 871, 483 P.2d at 39.
1972]
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However, identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes
usually serves little independent public purpose. Once legal proceedings
have terminated, and a suspect or offender has been released, identifi-
cation of the individual will not usually aid the administration of jus-
tice. Indentification will no longer serve to bring forth witnesses or
obtain succor for the victims. Unless the individual has reattracted the
public eye to himself in some independent fashion, the only public "in-
terest" that would usually be served is that of curiosity.35
This statement does not mean that all reports of the
names of people once involved in newsworthy events could
serve no public purpose, since there are some private citizens
in whom the public interest never wavered, just as there are
some events which are so imprinted upon the public memory
that all aspects of those events remain public. The determina-
tion of the category into which a persons falls is for the trier
of fact, according to the Briscoe court. Thus the court here re-
fused to hold as a matter of law that once newsworthy, always
newsworthy.
As in Melvin v. Reid30 the factor of rehabilitation played
an important part in the court's decision that Briscoe had a
cause of action. California has an indeterminate sentence law
which enables an offender to "minimize" his term of imprison-
ment by rehabilitation, and to allow the mass media at will to
bring up his past might destroy the effectiveness of the inde-
terminate sentence law and the emphasis on rehabilitation. 37
The court sympathized with those who attempted to forget the
mistakes of the past and make new and useful lives for them-
selves:
The masks we wear may be stripped away upon the occurrence of
some event of public interest. But just as the risk of exposure is a
concomitant of urban life, so too is the expectation of anonymity re-
gained. It would be a crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once
public never becomes private again. Human forgetfulness over time
puts today's "hot" news in tomorrow's dusty archives. In a nation of
200 million people there is ample opportunity for all but the most in-
famous to begin a new life.3S
To justify its vindication of Briscoe's cause of action the
court resorted to making value judgments on the worth of the
news in question, a determination from which courts have tra-
35. Id. at 872, 483 P.2d at 40.
36. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
37. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873, 483 P.2d 34, 41.
38. Id.
[Vol. 24
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ditionally shied.39 The jury, the court concluded, could rea-
sonably find that the plaintiff's name was not newsworthy,
since (1) its addition to the article served little social value,
(2) Briscoe had done nothing to reattract the public eye, (3)
most people would consider it grossly offensive to have their
past criminal record reported, and (4) society's interest in re-
habilitating the criminal should not be sacrificed without good
reason.40 In keeping with First Amendment rights, the plain-
tiff would in each ease have to prove that the "publisher in-
vaded his privacy with reckless disregard for the fact that rea-
sonable men would find the invasion highly offensive. '4 1
Briscoe differed from Melvin v. Reid42 and Wagner v.
Fawcett Publications3 first because it was decided with the
constitutional privilege in mind. Secondly, in both Melvin and
Wagner there existed some aspect of commercial exploitation
and very little legitimate purpose for publishing the article
and producing the movie. The Briscoe publication, on the other
hand, was acknowledged by the court to have served a legiti-
mate function.
III. CONCLUSION
The argument that the right to privacy is an endangered
tort, one which will in time be "swallowed up"44 by the in-
creasingly liberal First Amendment privileges accorded the
mass media, may be a valid one. The California court's fear of
such a result in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association could
have been a precipitative factor in the court's decision to up-
hold the cause of action of a man whose past activities had
placed his name on public record. It is too soon to know what
real effect or impact this decision will have on the conflict be-
tween the individual's right to privacy and the public's right
to the free dissemination of information concerning events of
public interest, but it is obvious that the case's holding did no-
thing to restrict the constitutional privilege with respect to
39. Moore, A Study in the Practical Application of the Right of Privacy,
22 S.C. L. REv. 1, 13 (1970).
40. 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875, 483 P.2d at 43.
41. Id. at 876, 483 P.2d at 43.
42. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
43. 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962).
44. Kalven, Privacy it Tort Law- Were Warren and Bradeis Wrong?
31 LA-w & CoNimmP. PRoB. 326 (1966).
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current events and names. The court reiterated the require-
ment that if one is to recover for invasion of privacy he must
prove that the publisher exhibited "reckless disregard for the
fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly offen-
sive."
The case did, however, deal with lapse of time and its ef-
fect on the scope of protection offered by the doctrine of news-
worthiness, and the fact that the court did not extend the priv-
ilege of the media to all publications of past newsworthy
events and names may be just as or even more noteworthy
than the fact that it recognized that the lapse of time could
and does have a great effect on newsworthiness of the use of a
name. Other important aspects of the case include the use of
value judgments to determine newsworthiness, the fact that
the trier of fact is to determine the newsworthiness in a situa-
tion such as this, and the awareness that there may be more
than one conflict of interest involved which should bear on the
final determination (e.g., rehabilitation interests and goals v.
right to free press and speech).
As one writer put it, "There is only one way properly to
strike a balance between the First Amendment freedoms of
speech and press and the common law protections of privacy,
name and reputation-very carefully."' 4 5 That also seems to be
the view of the Briscoe court. Whether the pronouncements of
that court will serve to further the cause of individuals in
other right to privacy suits remains to be seen. It is possible
that this case will be "distinguished" to such an extent that it
will have no real effect on the privacy-privilege conflict. But,
as previously mentioned, it will still have much impact due to
the fact that it considered a situation which had not previously
been decided with regard to the First Amendment rights, and
it decided in favor of the plaintiff rather than using it as a
means to enlarge the media's privilege.
SANDRA M. SCHRAIBMAN
45. Constitutional Law of Defamation and Privacy: Butts and Walker, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 649 (1968).
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